Abstract-In a population which consists of a large number of players interacting with each other, the payoff of each player often conflicts with the total payoff of the population which he/she belongs to. In such a situation, the "government" which has the comprehensive perspective is introduced for governing the population. When the government collects and reallocates players' payoffs for governing the population, the evolutions of population states are modeled by replicator-mutator dynamics. In this paper, we propose a model which describes the evolution of the government's reallocation strategy and investigate stability of its equilibrium points.
Introduction
A problem called social dilemma occurs when the purpose of each person conflicts with the total purpose of the community which he/she belongs to [1, 2] . Evolutionary game theory has been used as a powerful mathematical framework to analyze such a social problem [3, 4] . Especially, when the government collects and reallocates players' payoffs for governing the population, the evolutions of population states are modeled by replicator-mutator dynamics [5] .
The social problem is the conflict between the payoff of each player and the total payoff of the population. Therefore, such a problem is unsolvable by personal effort of each player. The "government" which has the comprehensive perspective is required for governing the population. In the real world, it corresponds to the rulers such as the government of countries or cities, and executives of organizations or companies. The government is willing to lead the population state to a desirable state by intervening in the population. In replicator dynamics with reallocation of payoffs [5] , we consider that players interact with each other in their own population and the government intervenes in the interactions by collecting and reallocating payoffs. In this model, the government's action is the rate of collecting payoffs from players and the rate is independent of the population state. However, in the case that the government can change the rate depending on the state as its policy, it can be modeled as a player.
In this paper, we define the government's payoff as a sum of benefits which depend on the current state of the popu- lation and a cost of the government's intervention. Moreover, we propose a model which describes the evolution of its payoff reallocation strategy, and investigate stability of its equilibrium points in the case that players have two strategies and the target state is on the boundary.
Intervention by Collection and Reallocation of Payoffs
We consider a population which consists of a large number of players and the "government" which intervenes in interactions between players who belong to the population. The intervention can be modeled as a strategy of the government. Suppose that the government changes its strategy depending on the population's state. In this paper, as the government's intervention, we deal with the collections and reallocations of players' payoffs. Figure 1 shows an illustration of the collection and the reallocation of payoffs by the government.
Let P be the population of players. Suppose that 
ji is a proportion of payoffs which is collected from players with j ∈ Φ p and reallocated to players with i ∈ Φ p to the total payoff of player with j ∈ Φ p . We call the matrix Q = (q ji ) a reallocation matrix. Using the above definitions, replicator dynamics with collections and reallocations of payoffs is given as follows [5] :
Equation (1) is known as replicator-mutator dynamics [6] . Suppose that Φ g = {1, 2} and S g are sets of pure and mixed strategies of the government, respectively. We call the first strategy complete intervention and the second strategy non-intervention. In this situation, a strategy s g = (α, 1 − α) ∈ S g defines a mixed strategy between those two strategies, where α is called an intervention rate and assumed to satisfy α ∈ [0, 1]. For the target population state s * p ∈ S p , we define the reallocation matrix Q as follows:
where I l is the l-dimensional unit matrix and
T . In this case, Eq. (1) is rewritten as follows:
When α = 0 holds (non-intervention), no payoffs of players are collected and reallocated. Eq. (3) is rewritten aṡ
On the other hand, when α = 1 holds (complete intervention), the government collects all payoffs of all players and reallocates them depending on the target state s * p . In this case, Eq. (3) is rewritten aṡ
Sincer p (s p ) > 0, the target state s * p is a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium point of Eq. (3).
The following proposition about Eqs. (3) and (4) has been proved [7] . 
Dynamic Intervention Rate
Let r i g : S p × S g → R be the payoff function for the government with the pure strategy i ∈ Φ g andr g (s p , s g ) be the government's current payoff, i.e.,r g (s p , s g ) = αr s g ). In this paper, we suppose that the government increases the intervention rate α in proportion to differences between the payoffs of the complete intervention strategy r 1 g and the current payoffsr g which the government earns. Such a rule of changing the intervention rate can also be modeled by replicator dynamics. Since the government has two strategies complete intervention and non-intervention, the replicator dynamics is formulated as follows:α
Using payoff matrices A, B, and C, we define the players ' 
The matrices B and C are the payoffs which depend on the current population state of P and the current intervention rate, respectively. We consider that the matrix B is the government's benefit depending on the current population state of P and the matrix C is a cost of the government's intervention depending on the current intervention rate. Assuming that the non-intervention strategy makes no benefits and costs, we define the matrices A, B, and C as follows:
where a i j ≥ 0 for all i and j ∈ Φ p , b i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ Φ p , and c 1 < 0.
Two Strategy Game: Boundary Target Point
Suppose that players of the population P have two strategies and the target point is s *
where
Since β 1 and β 2 are the ratios of the government's benefits b 1 and b 2 to the intervention cost c 1 , we consider them as cost-efficiencies of the government's interventions to players' strategies 1 and 2, respectively. 
Figure 2: Schematic of vector fields and equilibrium points of the two strategy games. Black squares marked by S are stable equilibrium points and black points marked by U are unstable equilibrium points.
We haveṡ 
andα = 0 holds on the line
s 1 p > 0 (resp. < 0) holds above (resp. below) the curve l 1 . α < 0 (resp. > 0) holds above (resp. below) the line l 2 . The curve l 1 depends only on players' payoff matrix A while the line l 2 depends on the government's payoff matrices B and C. Figure 2 shows typical patterns of equilibrium points and schematics of vector fields.
The coordinates of the points V, T 1 , T 0 , T l 1 , and T l 2 are (0, β 2 ), (1, 1), (1, 0) ,
, and (1, β 1 ), respectively. Moreover, the s 1 p -coordinates of the point W, W u , and W s are solutions of
Their α-coordinates are given by Eq. (13). holds, then we have Fig. 2(e) .
As shown in Fig. 2 , stability conditions of points T 1 , T l 2 , W, and W s are given as follows:
• T 1 is asymptotically stable if β 1 > 1 ( Fig. 2(a) );
• T l 2 is asymptotically stable if
( Fig. 2(e) ); and • W s is stable if a 21 −a 11 a 21 < β 1 < 1 and (w 2 ) 2 > 4a 22 β 2 w 1 ( Fig. 2(d) ). The target state s * p = (1, 0) T corresponds to the boundary edge T 1 T 0 in Fig. 2 . Therefore, the achievement of the target state requires that the point T l 2 or T 1 is asymptotically stable.
If the stability condition of the point T 1 holds, then the government keeps increasing the intervention rate α to the complete intervention strategy α = 1 since there is no reason for the government to reduce α. Although the target state is achieved, the original game structure is completely lost.
On the other hand, if the stability condition of T l 2 holds, then the target state is achieved and the intervention rate α keeps the intermediate level. Moreover, if the condition (w 2 ) 2 < 4a 22 β 2 w 1 also holds, then T l 2 is globally asymptotically stable (Fig. 2(b) ). To achieve the target state inde- pendent of initial population states of P, the cost-efficiency of the government's intervention not only to strategy 1 but also to strategy 2 must be sufficiently large.
If the cost-efficiency of the government's intervention to strategy 1 is less than
, then the cost of the intervention is so large that the government always wants to decrease the intervention rate. Thus the target state can not be achieved.
Example
Suppose that the payoff matrix A is given by
In such a game, players of P earn the maximum average payoff at the boundary point s p = (1, 0) T and the minimum average payoff at the other boundary point (0, 1)
T . Figure  3 shows examples of its phase portraits, where
The coordinates of the points T l 2 , V, and T l 1 are (1, b 1 ), (0, b 2 ), and (1,   1 3 ), respectively. Note that β 1 = b 1 and β 2 = b 2 hold in this case. Black squares correspond to stable equilibrium points.
In the case that b 1 = 0.2 and b 2 = 0.03, since the point T l 2 is below the point T l 1 , the equilibrium points T 0 , T l 2 , and T 1 which achieve the target state s * p = (0, 1)
T are unstable, and the point W is a uniquely stable equilibrium point (see Figs. 3(i) and 2(e) ).
In the case that b 1 = 0.35 and b 2 = 0.03, since the point T l 2 is above the point T l 1 , T l 2 is an asymptotically stable equilibrium point. However, the point W is also asymptotically stable since b 2 is not sufficiently large (see Figs. 3 (ii) and 2(d)).
In the case that b 1 = 0.35 and b 2 = 0.35, since the point T l 2 is above the point T l 1 and the point V is sufficiently high, there exists no intersection of l 1 with l 2 . Therefore, the point T l 2 is a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium point (see Figs. 3(iii) and 2(b) ).
In the case that b 1 = 1.2 and b 2 = 0.03, the point T l 2 is above T 1 , which is a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium point (see Figs. 3(iv) and 2(a) ).
Conclusions
In this paper, we have defined the government's payoff as a sum of benefits which depend on the current state of the population and a cost of the government's intervention. Moreover, we have proposed a model which describes the evolution of its payoff reallocation strategy, and have investigated stability of its equilibrium points in the case that players have two strategies and the target state is on the boundary.
